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11 Introduction
Pricing and selling strategies in the retail sector are hotly debated in policy circles. One im-
portant issue constitutes the so-called loss-leader pricing which refers to retail prices below or
just at marginal cost (OECD 2007). Below-cost pricing has gained in importance as consumers
increasingly prefer one-stop shopping and, thus, tend to bundle their purchases in order to econ-
omize on their shopping time. From a retailer pricing perspective, one-stop shopping leads to
complementarities among products even if they constitute substitutes, complements or indepen-
dent goods from a consumption point of view (Holton 1957, Bliss 1988, Betancourt and Gautschi
1990, Beggs 1994). It is well known that ￿rms o⁄ering at least two complementary goods may
￿nd it pro￿table to sell one of them below marginal costs in order to increase the demand for the
other good (Ramsey 1927 and Robinson 1933). Accordingly, sales at a loss are not necessarily
driven by the intention to exclude competitors but constitute a pro￿t-maximizing strategy of
the retailer and may increase social welfare.
This view typically ignores that the production structure consists of a vertical chain where
both retailers and manufacturers have some degree of market power. Moreover, contracts in
intermediate goods markets often rely on the result of negotiations, which are often not fully
e¢ cient.1 Assessing sales at a loss, these vertical relations seem to be crucial. For example,
Germany has recently enacted a general ban of selling food products at a loss. Among others, this
has been forced by complaints of supplier associations.2 They argue that competition between
retailers is passed on to intermediate goods markets. Likewise, the German Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection assesses below-cost pricing as an important driver
for squeezing wholesale prices, damaging suppliers￿image or jeopardizing quality assurance along
the value chain.
One contributions of this paper is to show how bargaining in input markets may a⁄ect the
1For a discussion see Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) as well as Inderst and Valetti (2008). Moreover, Rey and Tirole
(1986) show the relevance of the double marginalization problem in a context of demand and cost uncertainty.
2In 2005, the German Farmer Association (Deutscher Bauernverband) pushed their members to protest against
the decreasing prices for milk and in particular UHT milk at retail level. They directed their attention among
others to the German chain store Real which o⁄ered dairy products at heavily reduced prices, and obviously
below invoice prices in spring 2005. Such complains are not only con￿ned to food only as the recent complaint
by the German Association of Brand Manufacturers (Deutscher Markenverband) against below-cost prices by the
third largest German drug store Rossmann shows (Press Release of the Federal Cartel O¢ ce (Bundeskartellamt)
February 8th, 2007)
2assessment of below-cost pricing as a socially bene￿cial retail strategy. In particular, we analyze
below-cost pricing of retailers in a vertical setting and examine its impact on social welfare as
well as on suppliers￿incentives to invest in higher product quality. We consider a vertical struc-
ture with one retailer and several upstream manufacturers. With all her suppliers the retailer
negotiates over a linear wholesale price. Consumers are supposed to have one-stop shopping
preferences and buy di⁄erent goods together in one single trip. Shopping baskets consist of
particular core goods, such as staples, milk or tissue paper, which are bought by almost all
consumers, while the remaining goods included in consumers￿shopping baskets vary according
to their individual preferences. We assume, therefore, that one product of the retail assortment
is a core item. Due to consumers￿one-stop shopping behavior, this product constitutes a com-
plement to all other goods o⁄ered by the retailer. This coincides with products like milk which
are both typical loss-leaders as well as part of almost all consumers￿shopping baskets.
We ￿nd that the retailer sells the core good at a loss if consumers have strong preferences
for one-stop shopping and their willingness to pay for the good is relatively low. The model
also allows to examine how retail formats like hypermarkets and discounters a⁄ect the retailer￿ s
pricing strategy to be examined. We distinguish between the di⁄erent formats by considering
the overall size of the retail assortment as well as the characteristics of the retailer￿ s product
line. That is, the broadness of a product line refers to the number of di⁄erent categories, while
its depth stands for the variety of products within a particular category. The results show that
prices below cost are more likely the broader the product line of the retailer, and thus the greater
range of product categories the retailer sells to ￿nal consumers. The incentive to sell at a loss
is less likely the deeper and the larger the retail assortment. The conditions determining below-
cost pricing as a pro￿t-maximizing strategy are best met by discounters whose small assortment
consists of a broad product line with a low level of variety within each category. To the contrary,
we ￿nd that loss-leader prices do not constitute a pro￿t-maximizing strategy of hypermarkets
or specialized retailers.
Those results are driven by the negotiations on a linear wholesale price between the retailer
and her suppliers. Employing the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, we focus on the nego-
tiations about a linear wholesale price between the retailer and the supplier of the core good.
It turns out that a ban of below-cost pricing has two e⁄ects: A ban directly a⁄ects retailer￿ s
3price setting in downstream markets which in turn enhances the retailer￿ s bargaining position
vis-￿-vis the supplier of the core good. Due to consumers￿one-stop shopping preference, the
retailer has an incentive to set a low price for the core good in order to stimulate demand for
the other goods on which she can extract rents. Under a ban of below-cost pricing, however,
the retailer has to sell at least at marginal costs. By this, the retailer cannot fully exploit the
positive demand externalities resulting from one-stop shopping behavior. Correspondingly, the
supplier￿ s marginal contribution to the joint pro￿t with the retailer decreases, which results in
a lower wholesale price. Hence, a ban of below-cost pricing in retail markets serves as a vertical
restraint that softens the double marginalization in the vertical relation between the supplier
and the retailer. A ban of below-cost pricing is, therefore, socially bene￿cial. However, the
supplier always looses if a ban is enacted. Instead the retailer and consumers gain from a ban.
Furthermore, suppliers invest more and thus provide a higher quality under the ban.
The paper contributes to the literature on below-cost pricing. Beyond predation the eco-
nomic literature identi￿es several reasons for selling a good at a loss: (i) multi-product retailing
with complementary goods (Holton 1957, Hess and Gerstner 1987, Bliss 1988); (ii) price dis-
crimination according to consumers￿shopping baskets (DeGraba 2006, Jeuland and Narasimhan
1985); and ￿nally (iii) the signaling and commitment role of price advertisements (Bagwell 1987,
Simester 1995). Furthermore, there is a huge literature addressing price advertisements.3 But
so far, the economic literature has focused on the analysis of sales at a loss to their impact on
horizontal competition, while vertical e⁄ects have been almost always neglected. In this regard,
the paper of Allain and Chambolle (2005) is a notable exemption. They analyze below-cost
pricing in downstream markets within a vertical setting with one upstream supplier and two
competing retailers. They show that banning below-cost pricing in ￿nal consumer markets con-
verts wholesale prices into ￿ oor prices inducing similar e⁄ects such as resale price maintenance.
Since manufacturers may use the ban as a vertical restraint in order to raise pro￿ts at the ex-
pense of consumers and retailers, they bene￿t from the limitations in price setting. Given the
di⁄erent industry structure considered in our paper, we show the reverse: If below-cost pricing
is prohibited, the retailer can commit to deviate from optimal pricing which implies a weaker
3Mostly price promotions are explained by a ￿rm that sells one good to heterogeneous consumers. Thus, sales
can be caused by di⁄erences in consumer search costs (Stigler 1961, Salop 1977, Salop and Stiglitz 1982), in their
degree of price information (Varian 1980) or their store loyalty (Sobel 1984).
4bargaining position of the supplier. Our paper also di⁄ers from Allain and Chambolle (2005)
as we endogenize sales at a loss by modeling them as a result of a pro￿t-maximizing strategy of
the retailer.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we examine price-setting in downstream markets and negotiations in intermediate
good markets when below-cost pricing is feasible and under a ban of below-cost prices. The im-
plications of below-cost prices in retailing for social welfare are analyzed in Section 4. We extend
the model in Section 5 and show how below-cost pricing a⁄ects upstream supplier incentives to
invest in higher quality. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss some implications for competition
policy and conclude.
2 The Model
We consider a vertical structure with one downstream retailer R and an upstream industry that
provides i = 0;1;:::;n products. Hence, the upstream industry consists of n + 1 suppliers Si:
We assume that good 0 resembles one of the core products in consumption. Thus, the shopping
basket of the representative consumer consists of good 0 plus an optimal combination of the
goods j = 1;::;n: Since consumers bundle their purchases due to their preferences for one-
stop shopping, good 0 is supposed to constitute a complement to all other goods in the retail
assortment. We consider the following utility function for the representative consumer 4




v2 (￿) + q2


















where qi denotes the quantity of good i and pi denotes its price. This utility is in the spirit of the
standard Dixit utility function, where v (￿) indicates consumer￿ s utility from the consumption of
the goods j = 1;:::;n: v (￿) has the form of a standard CES utility function with ￿ denoting the
constant elasticity of substitution: The extent of one-stop shopping preferences is represented by
4In order to simplify the notation, we omit the arguments of the functions where this does not lead to any
confusion.
5the degree of complementarity ￿ 2 [0;1] between good q0 and v (￿): Consumers￿willingness to pay
is positively correlated with the parameter ￿ which in turn depends on supplier￿ s investments
for quality improvements or promotional activities. On the supplier side, marginal costs of
production c are the same for all products and supposed to be strictly positive. The retailer
does not bear any distribution or storage costs.
In order to focus on the relationship between the retailer and supplier S0; we assume that
goods j = 1;::;n are o⁄ered competitively, while good 0 is produced by one single ￿rm. The
retailer negotiates with all her suppliers on delivery contracts which are speci￿ed by a linear
tari⁄ wi. Note that the suppliers Sj get each the wholesale price wj = c:
We assume the following two-stage game and analyze subgame perfect equilibria: In the ￿rst
stage of the game, the retailer negotiates with supplier S0 on a linear wholesale price w0. In
stage two, the retailer sets prices in downstream markets. Within this framework, we compare
the equilibrium prices without any restrictions on retail prices with the equilibrium prices under
a general ban of below-cost pricing.
3 Consumer Prices and Negotiations
We ￿rst characterize optimal retail prices in downstream markets and examine the conditions
under which below-cost pricing may be an optimal retail pricing strategy. We then solve for
the negotiation outcome between the supplier S0 and the retailer under both regimes, i.e. unre-
stricted price setting and a general ban of below-cost pricing. Given our results, we examine the
implications a general ban has for social welfare. In particular, we consider consumer surplus as
well as the supplier￿ s and the retailer￿ s pro￿t.
3.1 Consumer Prices
In the second stage of the game, the retailer sets her prices in the downstream market. De￿ning
m =
Pn
j=1 pjqj and applying the composite commodity theorem, we decompose the represen-
6tative consumer￿ s decision into two problems, P1 and P2; with
P1: min
qi
m subject to v(￿) ￿ v (2)
P2: max
q0;v e u(m(v;p0;p;￿);￿) (3)
with: p = (p1;:::;pn);
where m(v;p0;p;￿) denotes the solution of P1 and e u(￿;m(v;p0;p;￿)) is given by
e u(m(v;p;￿);￿) = v (￿) + ￿q0 ￿
v2 (￿) + q2
0 ￿ 2￿v (￿)q0
2
￿ p0q0 ￿ m(￿): (4)
























Note that ￿ 2 (1;1) can be interpreted as the level of product di⁄erentiation: The higher ￿ the
more di⁄erentiated are the products o⁄ered by the retailer. The parameter n determines the
size of the retail assortment as it stands for the number of products the retailer o⁄ers to ￿nal
consumers.
Turning to P2 and di⁄erentiating e u(￿;m) with respect to q and v; we get
q￿
0(￿) =
￿ ￿ p0 + (1 ￿ mv(￿))￿




1 + ￿￿ ￿ mv ￿ ￿p0
1 ￿ ￿2 (7)
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1 ￿ ￿2 (9)
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Using (9) and (10), the pro￿ts ￿R(￿) and ￿S
0(￿) of the retailer and the supplier S0; respectively,
are given by







0(￿) = (w0 ￿ c)q￿
0(￿): (12)














The results show that the retailer sets the standard monopoly price for the complementary good.
The retail prices for the other goods decrease in the size of the retail assortment, while they
increase the more di⁄erentiated the products are.
Note that we can describe di⁄erent types of retail formats by using the parameter n and ￿.
The profound consolidation process in retailing has come along with the creation of a wide range
of di⁄erent store formats like discounters and hypermarkets. Discounters sell a broad product
line with a multitude of di⁄erent product categories, whereas the variety of products within each
product category is rather low. Hence, discounters￿assortment is characterized by a high degree
of product di⁄erentiation, i.e. ￿ relatively high, and a limited size of products, i.e. n rather low.
While discounters o⁄er only a poor selection of substitutable products, hypermarkets satisfy a
wide range of di⁄erent consumer tastes. That is, hypermarkets o⁄er a deeper product line with
a large number of substitutes within each category. Compared to discounters, hypermarkets are
determined by a lower level of product di⁄erentiation, i.e. a lower level of ￿. In terms of size,
the hypermarket largely exceeds the discounter. Hence, it accounts for a higher n: A further
8store format that is still relatively common constitutes the specialized retailer. Her assortment
is characterized by a limited product line, which implies a small overall size and a low degree of
product di⁄erentiation. Accordingly, this type of retail format is represented by low n and low
￿:
3.2 Bargaining without a Ban
Turning to the ￿rst stage of the game, the retailer agrees with supplier S0 on a delivery contract
in the form of a linear wholesale price w0. The wholesale price w0 is determined according
to the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution so that joint surplus is equally shared. Both, the
retailer and the supplier, receive their disagreement payo⁄s plus a share of the joint pro￿t.
However, negotiations on a linear price induce a trade-o⁄: A higher wholesale price increases
supplier￿ s pro￿t but decreases the total pie to be shared because of the induced problem of
double marginalization.
We assume that supplier S0￿ s disagreement payo⁄ is equal to zero. The retailer, however,
may still sell the goods j = 1;:::;n in the case of negotiation breakdown with supplier S0: If the
retailer fails to achieve an agreement with supplier S0; the demand b qj (￿) can be simply derived
by setting q0 = 0 in the Dixit utility function (see (1)) and maximizing consumers￿utility which
leads to




















Using (15) and assuming no renegotiation in the case of negotiation breakdown with supplier
S0, retailer￿ s disagreement payo⁄ is given by
b ￿R (￿) =
n X
i=1
(pj (￿) ￿ c) b qj (￿): (16)
The optimal price that the retailer sets in downstream markets if she fails to ￿nd an agreement
with supplier S0 refers again to









Given (13) and (14), let ￿R￿(w0;￿) and ￿S￿
0 (w0;￿) denote the reduced pro￿t functions of the
9retailer and the supplier respectively. Hence, the Nash Product can be written as
NP =
h




Maximizing (18) with respect to w0; the optimal wholesale price is given by
w￿
0 :=
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ cn1=￿) + 3c
4
: (19)
Lemma 1 The wholesale price negotiated between the retailer and supplier S0 is increasing in
consumers￿preferences for one-stop shopping, i.e. ￿; their willingness to pay ￿ as well as in the
degree of product di⁄erentiation ￿: However, it is decreasing in the size of the retail assortment
n:
The stronger consumers￿preferences for one-stop shopping the more supplier S0 contributes
to the joint pro￿t with the retailer. Accordingly, the wholesale price w￿
0 (￿;￿) increases in ￿:
The same holds for ￿ indicating consumers￿willingness to pay for the complementary product.
Likewise the joint pro￿t of the retailer and supplier S0 increases, if the goods j = 1;:::;n become
more di⁄erentiated. Thus, the wholesale price is increasing in ￿: However, the larger the size of
the assortment the higher the retailer￿ s pro￿t if no agreement is achieved with supplier S0: As a
consequence, the marginal contribution of supplier S0 is decreasing in the number of additional
products the retailer o⁄ers to ￿nal consumers. This in turn leads to a lower wholesale price in
equilibrium.
In order to assess the conditions under which below-cost pricing in retailing occurs, (13)
already shows that
p￿
0 (￿;￿) ? w0 () ￿ ? w0: (20)





(1 ￿ cn1=￿) + c: (21)
Proposition 1 Sales at a loss constitute a pro￿t maximizing strategy in retailing if consumers￿
willingness to pay is su¢ ciently low, i.e. ￿ < ￿c
1(￿): Below-cost pricing becomes more likely
the higher consumer preferences for one-stop shopping and the higher the di⁄erentiation of the
10additional goods included in the shopping basket, i.e. d￿c
1(￿)=d￿ > 0 and d￿c
1(￿)=d￿ > 0: However,
retailer￿ s incentives for selling at a loss decrease if the size of the assortment increases, i.e.
d￿c
1(￿)=dn < 0:
Our results show that sales at a loss may constitute a pro￿t-maximizing strategy of the
retailer without being driven by anti-competitive behavior. That is, by selling goods at a loss
the retailer does not necessarily aim at driving competitors out of the market. In fact, the retailer
reacts to the increasing one-stop shopping preferences of consumers when she sells below-cost. By
o⁄ering a wide range of di⁄erent products, the retailer allows consumers to bundle their purchases
and thus to reduce their shopping time. This in turn induces positive demand externalities. As
particular goods like milk, eggs, meat or other frequently purchased items are more important
to consumers than others, the retailer attracts a large number of consumers by selling these
products at a low price or even at a loss. Accordingly, these products serve as driver of ￿store-
tra¢ c￿ . And the more consumers enter the store outlet, the higher the retailer￿ s opportunity to
extract rents on the other goods included in consumers￿shopping basket.
However, we ￿nd that the retailer has an incentive to sell core products at a loss, only if
consumers￿willingness to pay is relatively low. This can also be observed in real life where
milk or vegetable oil are typical loss-leaders. We further show that the incentives to sell at a
loss become stronger if the other products the retailer o⁄ers are su¢ ciently di⁄erentiated. That
is, if the retailer o⁄ers a wide range of di⁄erent categories. Below-cost pricing becomes even
more likely the fewer products the retail assortment includes. Hence, discounters, which are
particularly characterized by a small size but a high number of di⁄erent product categories,
have the strongest incentives to sell at a loss. In contrast, very specialized retailers o⁄er a large
range of less di⁄erentiated products and hypermarkets￿assortment is characterized by a larger
number of products which makes sales at a loss less likely.
Our model, therefore, generates a number of relevant predictions concerning the pricing
behavior of particular retail markets. Although there is some research on the impact of the
market structure on retail pricing, most of the literature is salient about the relation between
retail format and retail pricing. One notable exception are Cataluna et al. (2005) who show
that price discount o⁄ered by discounters are in some cases higher than price discounts o⁄ered
by hypermarkets.
11Note further that below-cost pricing does not result from the strong bargaining position
retailers may have vis-￿-vis suppliers. The more bargaining power the retailer has, the lower
the wholesale prices negotiated with suppliers. However, wholesale prices increase if suppliers
have full take-it or leave-it power. As a consequence, below-cost pricing becomes more likely as
the retailer has a stronger incentive to soften the double mark-up problem. Thus, an increase
in buyer power may decrease the likelihood of sales at a loss.
3.3 Bargaining under a Ban
If a per-se ban of below-cost pricing is put into force, prices have to be at least equal to wholesale
prices. The retailer has to maximize her pro￿t ￿R such that p0 ￿ w0; i.e.
max
p0;p ￿R subject to p0 ￿ w0: (22)
Apparently, the constraint is only binding if ￿ ￿ ￿c
1(￿): Since the retailer￿ s pro￿t is strictly
decreasing in p0 as long as p0 > p￿
0, the retailer increases p0 such that the constraint is just
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> > > <
> > > :
c+n￿1=￿





Compared to the case of unrestricted retail prices, equilibrium prices for the substitutable goods
e p￿
j are reduced as long as the ban is binding, i.e. w0 > ￿: Given (23) and (24), let e ￿R￿(e wi;￿) and
e ￿S￿
0 (e w0;￿) denote the reduced pro￿t functions of the retailer and the supplier respectively. Since
the disagreement payo⁄s are not a⁄ected by the ban, the optimal wholesale price negotiated
between the retailer and the supplier is given by
e w￿
0 (￿;￿) : = argmax
w0
g NP (25)
with : g NP =
h





0 (￿;￿); there exists a threshold ￿c
2(￿) indicating that e w￿








(1 ￿ cn1=￿)2￿2 ￿
￿(4 ￿ ￿2)(￿ ￿ c) + ￿(1 ￿ cn1=￿)
￿
8(1 ￿ ￿2)





4 ￿ ￿2 + c:
Note that ￿c
2(￿) is strictly lower than ￿c
1(￿): Hence, the optimal wholesale prices under a ban are
given by
e w￿
0 (￿;￿) > ￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿c
2
e w￿




0 (￿;￿) = w￿
0 (￿;￿) if ￿ ￿ ￿c
1:
(26)
If a ban of below-cost pricing is enforced and the ban is binding, the retailer has to deviate from
the optimal pricing rule. That is, e p￿
0 increases for ￿ < ￿c
3(￿) that is implicitly given by
e p￿
0(￿c





In the interval [￿c
3;￿c
1] e p￿
0 decreases as a result of a ban. Inspection of (24) and (14) shows that
the retailer lowers the prices e p￿
j for the remaining goods as a consequence of a ban if ￿ < ￿c
2(￿).
In the interval [￿c
2;￿c
1]; e p￿
j remains equal. Therefore, the retailer cannot fully exploit the one-stop
shopping externality by ￿rst attracting consumers and then extracting rents on the remaining
goods. Our results are illustrated by a numerical example for c = 0:1;n = 20;￿ = 0:5; and
￿ = 20 (see Figure 1). Correspondingly, we can state that a core good plays a notable role
in the increase in overall sales, as long as it serves as a loss-leader. However, under a ban the
importance of these core goods is reduced. As a consequence, the supplier S0 contributes less to
the joint surplus with the retailer. This in turn leads to a lower wholesale price, i.e. e w￿
0 < w￿
0:
Summarizing our results, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If a ban of below-cost pricing is binding, i.e. ￿ < ￿c
1(￿), the retailer sets e p￿
0 = e w￿
0
and reduces the prices for all remaining goods, i.e. e p￿
j < p￿
j; if ￿ < ￿c
2(￿). As a consequence of
the ban, the negotiated wholesale price is reduced, i.e. e w￿














Figure 1: Downstream and Wholesale Prices under both Regimes




0 holds since e w￿
0 = ￿ (see (26)) and w￿
0 > ￿: For ￿ < ￿c
2;











(1 ￿ cn1=￿)2￿2(4 ￿ 3￿2)








< 0 is ful￿lled for all ￿ < ￿c
2: Hence, we get that e w0 < w0 for
all ￿ < ￿c
1:
Since a ban results in a lower wholesale price, it reduces the double mark-up externality in
the vertical relationship between the retailer and her supplier. This is a ￿rst hint of the negative
impact below-cost pricing may have on social welfare as it strengthens the problem of double
marginalization.5
4 Implications for Social Welfare
A ban of sales at a loss has two di⁄erent e⁄ects on consumer prices. First of all, the retailer has
to deviate from the prices she would set without a ban. This in turn implies that the retailer
cannot fully exploit the externalities resulting from consumers￿shopping behavior. Therefore
the marginal contribution of the supplier is reduced which leads to a lower wholesale price
negotiated in intermediate good markets. Hence, a ban of below-cost pricing changes prices in
5Note, however, that the problem of double marginalization vanishes if more complex contracts are negotiated
in intermediate good markets.
14￿nal consumer markets and lowers wholesale prices. Before assessing the overall welfare e⁄ect,
we analyze how a ban a⁄ects the distribution of rents.
Comparing consumer utility under both regimes, it is easy to show that consumer surplus
under a ban is always higher than without a ban.
Lemma 2 Consumers always bene￿t from a ban of below-cost pricing.
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 2, we compare U (￿) and e U (￿) with
U (￿) =
4(1 ￿ mv)2 + (￿ ￿ w￿
0)[￿ ￿ w￿
0 + 4￿(1 ￿ mv)]
8(1 ￿ ￿2)
(28)
e U (￿) =
4(1 ￿ ￿)2 + 4(￿ ￿ e w￿
0)[￿ ￿ e w￿
0 + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
8(1 ￿ ￿2)
(29)










0 always holds, consumers always bene￿t from the ban.
The supplier, however, loses if a ban of below-cost pricing is enforced. This comes due to the
fact that her bargaining position is weakened by the ban such that she receives a lower wholesale
price. On the contrary, the retailer always bene￿ts from a ban. Obviously, retailer￿ s pro￿t is
not a⁄ected by the ban at ￿c
1 where w￿
0 = e w￿
0 = ￿ is ful￿lled. Moreover, it is easy to show that a
retailer bene￿ts from a ban at ￿c
3 where prices under both regimes are equal, i.e. e p￿
0 = e w￿
0 = p￿
0;
and wholesale prices are lower due to the ban, i.e. e w￿
0 < w￿
0: For all other values ￿ < ￿c
1 the
retailer bene￿ts from the ban as the reduced wholesale price she has to pay for the core product
fully compensates her losses induced by her deviation from optimal wholesale prices.
Lemma 3 A ban of sales at a loss in downstream markets harms the supplier, while the retailer
bene￿ts.
Proof. See Appendix.
Denoting W(￿) = U￿(￿) + ￿R￿(￿) + ￿S￿
0 (￿) and f W(￿) = e U￿(￿) + e ￿R￿(￿) + e ￿S￿
0 (￿) the social
welfare under both regimes and evaluating ￿W(￿) = f W(￿)￿ W(￿) for c = 0, we obtain
￿W(￿)jc=0 =
1 ￿ ￿ + 2￿(￿ + w￿
0 ￿ 2e w￿
0￿) + (￿ + w￿
0)




with : ￿ = [1 + ￿(￿ ￿ e w￿
0)]:
15Hence, social welfare increases under a ban if marginal costs of production are normalized to zero.
Note that the impact of the number of products included in the retail assortment disappears











0 ￿ e w￿
0)(2 + ￿n
1




4 (1 ￿ ￿2)
> 0: (31)
Our result shows that the higher the marginal costs, the more increases the di⁄erence in social
welfare.
Proposition 3 For given ￿ and marginal costs of production su¢ ciently low; social welfare is
increasing if a ban of below-cost pricing is enforced. In particular, consumers and the retailer
always gain from the ban, while the supplier loses.
While the supplier bene￿ts if her good is sold at a loss, the increasing wholesale price results
in a welfare loss. In particular, consumers lose if the retailer sells at a loss since this enhances
the problem of double marginalization.
5 Investment Decision
In this section we add an additional stage where the supplier S0 decides about her investment
for quality improvements or promotional activities. These investments lead to an increase of
consumers￿willingness to pay ￿; whereas we assume that ￿ is common knowledge. For the in-
vestment, the supplier S0 bears costs C(￿) with C0;C00 > 0: We compare the optimal investment
decision of supplier S0; if the retailer does not underlie a restriction in downstream price setting,
with the investment decision if a ban is put into force.
The optimal levels of investment under both regimes, i.e. ￿￿ and e ￿
￿














In the case of relatively low investment costs C(￿); a ban does not a⁄ect supplier￿ s investment
16decision as long as e ￿
￿
> ￿c
1. However, for intermediate or high levels of investment costs, it can
be shown that the supplier always extends her investments if a ban of below-pricing is put into
force. On the one hand, a ban of below-cost pricing weakens the bargaining position of supplier
S0 which in turn leads to a lower wholesale price (see Proposition 2). On the other hand, a
higher ￿ improves her bargaining position vis-￿-vis the retailer leading to a higher wholesale
price.
Lemma 4 In the case of intermediate or high levels of ￿xed investment costs C(￿) and c su¢ -





Taking corner solution into account, the supplier S0 may even have an incentive to excessively
invest by increasing e ￿
￿
up to ￿c
1: With su¢ ciently low investment costs and consumers￿preference
for one-stop shopping relatively strong, the supplier chooses a level of ￿ where the ban is not
binding. With higher costs, the supplier also tends to invest in order to avoid the ban. However,
the positive e⁄ect of circumventing the ban is compensated by increasing ￿xed costs. Assuming
￿ = 2; n = 10; c = 1=10 and C(￿) = k￿2, we get the numeric results for supplier￿ s investment
decision as indicated in Table 1.
If we suppose that ￿ is endogenously chosen by the supplier, the higher investment of supplier
S0 also implies a higher level of social welfare. But a ban may also lead to excessive investments
at the supplier side which may negatively a⁄ect social welfare.
Table 1: Supplier￿ s Investment Decision















































Accordingly, our numeric results show (see Table 2) that welfare e⁄ects with endogenously
chosen ￿ are ambiguous. That is, suppliers excessively invest if costs for investment are su¢ -
ciently low and consumers have only weak preferences for one-stop shopping.
Hence, our results can be summarized as follows:
17Table 2: Welfare E⁄ects of Excessive Investments




;￿) 0.182 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181













1 0.3786 0.342 0.324
W(￿￿;￿) 0.679 0.427 0.365 0.337 0.320 0.31
Proposition 4 Below-cost pricing by retailers reduces supplier￿ s incentives to invest in quality
improvements of their products.
The negative e⁄ects below-cost pricing has on social welfare are robust in a dynamic setting.
Moreover, our ￿ndings approve that sales at a loss negatively a⁄ect the quality provided by
upstream suppliers. This fear has been expressed by the German Federal Ministry of Food,
Agriculture and Consumer Protection in the recent debate on the general ban of selling food
products at a loss. But in contrast to the common reasoning, we show that higher investment
incentives are due to a weakened bargaining position of the supplier and the fact that the
marginal impact of ￿ in w0 is higher under a ban.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that below-cost pricing is not necessarily driven by predatory
purposes. To the contrary, sales at a loss may rather constitute an optimal pricing strategy which
replies to the increasingly observed one-stop shopping behavior of consumers. Furthermore, our
model allows us to relate the retail format in terms of size and product di⁄erentiation to the
chosen pricing strategy. That is, the stronger consumers￿preference for one-stop shopping, the
more likely are sales at a loss at downstream retailers. Retailer￿ s incentives to sell at a loss also
increase if she o⁄ers a broad product line allowing for one-stop shopping, while her incentives
decrease the more products her assortment includes and the deeper her product line. These
results explain why sales at a loss more likely to prevail at discounters than at hypermarkets or
specialized retailers.
Although below-cost pricing is not intended to harm competitors, it negatively a⁄ects social
welfare by enhancing the double marginalization in the vertical relation between the retailer and
18the supplier. That is, a retailer uses core products of consumers￿shopping basket like milk as
a loss-leader in order to increase store tra¢ c and thus overall sales at the retail outlet. As a
consequence, the supplier contributes more to the joint surplus with the retailer which leads to a
higher wholesale price. If the retailer is forced to set prices at least equal to marginal costs, the
supplier￿ s marginal contribution decreases resulting in a lower wholesale prices. A ban, therefore,
serves as a vertical restraint which lowers the problem of double marginalization. Hence, our
results imply that below-cost pricing can be detrimental to social welfare. Therefore, it seems
to be appropriate to assess below-cost pricing by a rule of reason approach that considers the
market structure explicitly.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3






















and rearranging terms, we get
￿S￿

























Obviously, the inequality (37) is always ful￿lled such that the supplier gains less if price setting
in downstream markets is restricted. Turning to the retailer and de￿ning the di⁄erence in retail
pro￿ts under both regimes as ￿￿R(￿) = e ￿R￿(￿) ￿ ￿R￿(￿); we obtain
￿￿R(￿) =
￿2(e w￿
0 ￿ ￿)2 + 2￿(1 ￿ cn1=￿)(w￿





￿￿R(￿) becomes zero when w￿
0 = e w￿
0 = ￿; i.e. ￿￿R(￿)
￿ ￿
￿=￿c
1 = 0. In order to prove that ￿￿R(￿)
19is also positive for all ￿ < ￿c






c=0 = 0 with
e wc





9(￿ + ￿)2 + 16(1 ￿ ￿2)
4￿
: (39)







for all ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 [0;￿=3]: Hence, e w0 < e wc
0 the di⁄erence of retail pro￿ts ￿￿R(￿) is always
positive if production costs c are su¢ ciently low.
Proof of Lemma 4
In order to prove e ￿
￿
> ￿￿; we show that de ￿S￿




























First of all, we characterize de w￿
0=d￿. Since sign[de w￿














3(2 ￿ ￿2)(￿2 ￿ 4￿ e w￿
0 + 3e w￿2
0 ) + (4 ￿ ￿2)(2￿ + ￿ ￿ 4e w￿
0)
￿
8(1 ￿ ￿2)2 : (41)
Using that ￿ < e w￿
0 < w￿
0 holds under a ban and showing that (2￿ + ￿ ￿ 4e w￿
0)je w￿
0=w￿
0 = 2￿ + ￿ ￿
(￿ + ￿) > 0 and (￿2 ￿ 4￿ e w￿





0=￿+" = ￿2 ￿ 4￿(￿ + ") + 3(￿ + ")2 = 3"2 + 2￿" > 0; we





is strictly positive. Hence, de w￿
0=d￿ > 0 if production costs c
are su¢ ciently low. Knowing that @e ￿S















8(2 ￿ ￿2)e w￿
0 ￿ 3(￿ + ￿)
16(1 ￿ ￿2)
> 0: (43)




< 0; e ￿
￿
> ￿￿ holds for su¢ ciently low levels
of c:
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